Issues Related to the Governor’s Address to the State Legislature

By / January 31, 2026

Source: The Hindu
Relevance: GS Paper II (Polity and Governance)

Key Terms

For Prelims:
Governor’s Address; Article 176; Article 175; Article 163; Article 159; Motion of Thanks; Government of India Act, 1935; Provincial Autonomy; Federalism; Constitutional Morality

For Mains:
Governor–State Relations; Limits of Gubernatorial Discretion; Parliamentary Democracy; Responsible Government; Cooperative Federalism; Centre–State Relations; Judicial Review; Constitutional Conventions

Article Framework

  • Why in News?
  • Historical Context
  • Constituent Assembly Perspective
  • Constitutional Provisions Governing the Address
  • Motion of Thanks
  • Judicial Interpretation of the Governor’s Role
  • Recent Controversies
  • Debate on Gubernatorial Discretion
  • Committee Recommendations
  • Way Forward
  • Conclusion
  • UPSC PYQs
  • CARE MCQs

Why in News?

Recent conduct by Governors in several Opposition-ruled States—such as leaving the Assembly mid-session or selectively omitting portions of a cabinet-approved address—has revived debate on the compulsory nature of Article 176, the scope of the Governor’s discretion, and the primacy of the elected Council of Ministers within a parliamentary system.

Historical Context

Colonial Legacy

  • Section 63 of the Government of India Act, 1935 authorised the Governor to address the Provincial Legislature at his discretion.
  • With the introduction of provincial autonomy in 1937, conventions evolved whereby:
    • The address was drafted in consultation with the Council of Ministers.
    • It articulated the legislative agenda of the elected provincial government.

Even under colonial arrangements, discretionary authority gradually gave way to ministerial responsibility.

Constituent Assembly’s Perspective

The Constituent Assembly deliberately rejected the discretionary framework of the 1935 Act. Its intent was clear:

  • The Governor would act as a constitutional head rather than an independent authority.
  • The address would convey the policies of the elected government, not the Governor’s personal views.
  • The Governor was envisaged as a neutral constitutional figure, not a political actor.

Constitutional Provisions Governing the Address

Article 176 – Mandatory Address

  • The Governor is required to address the State Legislature:
    • At the first session after a general election, and
    • At the first session of each year.

Key features include:

  • A compulsory constitutional obligation
  • Preparation by the Council of Ministers
  • Presentation of government achievements and future policy priorities

This provision ensures that a newly formed government formally places its agenda before elected representatives and the public.

Article 175 – Optional Address

  • Empowers the Governor to address either House or both Houses at discretion.
  • This does not override or dilute the mandatory nature of Article 176.

Article 163 – Aid and Advice

  • Mandates that the Governor act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except where the Constitution explicitly grants discretion.
  • No such discretion exists with respect to the Article 176 address.

Motion of Thanks on the Governor’s Address

Article 176 also requires legislative rules to allocate time for discussion of the address through a Motion of Thanks. This process enables:

  • Debate by both ruling and opposition members
  • Legislative scrutiny of government policies
  • Democratic accountability through a formal vote

Judicial Interpretation of the Governor’s Role

The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised the ceremonial and limited nature of gubernatorial authority:

  • Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974):
    A Constitution Bench ruled that the Governor is a constitutional head bound by ministerial advice, with no scope for personal discretion in executive functions.
  • Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016):
    The Court held that discretionary powers are narrow and explicitly defined; functions under Articles 175 and 176 must be exercised on ministerial advice.
  • State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2024):
    The Court clarified that the Governor cannot use discretion to delay or obstruct the functioning of an elected government.

Recent Developments Fueling the Debate

  • Tamil Nadu: Portions of the address were omitted in 2022 and 2023; since 2024, the mandatory address under Article 176 has not been delivered.
  • Kerala: The Governor excluded selected paragraphs from the cabinet-approved address.
  • Karnataka: The Governor delivered only a brief statement and exited the joint session.

These actions depart from established constitutional conventions.

Debate on Gubernatorial Discretion

Arguments Supporting Discretion

  1. Constitutional Oath (Article 159): The Governor must safeguard the Constitution and may object to content perceived as unconstitutional or misleading.
  2. Freedom to Dissent: As a constitutional authority, the Governor is not expected to mechanically endorse content that undermines the office.
  3. Constitutional Silence: Articles 175 and 176 do not explicitly mandate verbatim reading, leaving interpretive ambiguity.
  4. Union Link: As a constitutional bridge between the Union and the States, the Governor may seek to protect national unity and federal integrity.
  5. Institutional Consistency: Reading content inconsistent with prior constitutional actions may create contradictions.

Arguments Opposing Discretion

  1. Aid and Advice Doctrine (Article 163): Under the parliamentary system, executive authority rests with elected ministers.
  2. Character of the Address: It is a policy statement of the government, not the Governor’s personal message.
  3. Federal Balance: Unilateral gubernatorial action undermines State autonomy.
  4. Parliamentary Democracy: Discretion in routine functions risks creating an alternative power centre.
  5. Legislative Privilege: Interference weakens the Legislature’s right to debate government policy.
  6. Judicial Oversight: Constitutional disputes are to be resolved by courts, not individual office-holders.

Committee Recommendations

  • Sarkaria Commission (1988):
    Advised that Governors should not function as agents of the Centre and should act as facilitators of cooperative federalism.
  • Punchhi Commission (2007):
    Recommended limiting additional roles of Governors and emphasised adherence to core constitutional responsibilities.

Way Forward

  1. Codifying Conventions: Reinforce the convention that the constitutional head does not deviate from the approved address.
  2. Judicial Clarification: Issue declaratory guidelines affirming the mandatory and non-discretionary nature of Article 176.
  3. Capacity Building: Provide structured constitutional training for Governors on federalism and judicial precedents.
  4. Institutional Dialogue: Encourage pre-session consultations between Governors and Chief Ministers.
  5. Time-bound Communication: Require Governors to convey objections in writing within a stipulated period.

Conclusion

The debate surrounding the Governor’s address raises a core constitutional issue—the balance between the Governor’s oath-bound responsibilities and the supremacy of the elected executive. Constitutional text, historical practice, Constituent Assembly intent, and judicial interpretation overwhelmingly constrain gubernatorial discretion in Assembly addresses. Upholding constitutional morality, cooperative federalism, and parliamentary democracy demands that the Governor’s address remain a formal articulation of government policy, rather than a vehicle for individual discretion.

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